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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
LAYTON CITY,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 930130-CA

v.
ROBERT D. ALSTON,

Argument Priority No, 2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a jury verdict and conviction in the
Second Circuit Court Layton Department.

Pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d), the Utah Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction over criminal appeals from the circuit courts.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court is presented with the following issues on appeal:
1.

Whether the jury instructions fairly tendered the case

to the jury.
2.

Whether the facts set forth at trial were sufficient to

support the jury's guilty verdict.1
Defendant/Appellant states issue (1) as follows: "The facts
as alleged at trial do not constitute the offense for which
[Defendant/Appellant] was convicted."
A review of the argument on
this issue reveals that the issue is actually whether the City set
forth evidence sufficient to establish every element of the case.
The Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented
at trial to show that he did not act with legal privilege when he
stabbed and killed a six month old husky-malamute puppy. In State

1

3.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting canine

autopsy photographs.
4.

Whether Defendant received effective assistance of

counsel.
5.

Whether the transcript is sufficient to allow the Court

to adequately review the proceedings below.
6.

Whether the Court should address constitutional issues

not raised below and, if so, whether the statute under which
defendant was convicted is constitutional.
7.

Whether the proceedings were cumulatively so flawed as

to justify extraordinary relief.
The standard of review for each of the issues presented is
as follows:
Jury Instructions.

This Court must insure that the

Defendant's theory of the case was adequately presented to the
jury.

Jury instructions state the law of the case, presenting a

question of law which the Court will review for correctness.
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992).

However, in

reviewing for correctness the Court must review the jury
instructions as a whole.

This court has ruled that it will

v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). The defendant filed motions
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for recording
conviction of the next lower category of offense based upon the
alleged lack of evidence showing an intentional and knowing
killing, an essential element of the first degree murder charge for
which he was convicted. The Utah Supreme Court found that motions
based upon the alleged lack of evidence as to certain elements of
the offense were essentially challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence.
Therefore, issues (1) and (2) raised in Defendant's
brief are both claims of insufficiency of the evidence and will be
treated as such for purposes of this appeal.
2

affirm when the instructions taken as a whole, "fairly tender the
case to the jury," even where "one or more of the instructions,
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have
been." State v. Garrett, 207 Utah Adv. Reps. 45 (Utah App. 1993).
(citing State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991)
(citations omitted)).
Sufficiency of the Evidence.

This Court has consistently

reiterated that when reviewing a jury verdict the Court views the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the verdict.

State v. Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Rep.

100 (Utah App. 1993). It is only when the evidence, as viewed in
this light, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt that it is proper to overturn the conviction.
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991).
Admission of Evidence.

In reviewing a trial court's ruling

on the admissibility of evidence under Utah R. Evid. 403, this
Court will not overturn the lower court's determination unless it
was an "abuse of discretion."

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,

239-240 (Utah 1992); see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah
1989); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986).

An abuse

of discretion will be found only if the trial court's finding
that the evidence was admissible was "beyond the limits of
reasonability."

Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240.

If this Court finds that the trial court's decision to admit
was "beyond the limits of reasonability," the verdict
3

will

reversed only if Defendant can show that, absent the error, there
is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been more
favorable to the defendant,

Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Reps, at 109.

(citing Hamilton, P.2d at 240; Verde, 770 P.2d at 121.
Effective Assistance of Counsel.

The Court must determine,

as a matter of law2, whether defense counsel's performance
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.3

Vigil # Id.

However, the defendant bears the burden of showing the trial
counsel's performance was deficient and that defendant suffered
unfair prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Vigil,
Id. (citing State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 194 S.Ct. 2052,
2070, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401,405
(Utah 1986)).
Adequacy of Trial Transcript.

This Court has ruled that the

"mere existence of [transcription errors] does not mandate a new
trial."

The defendant must make a showing of prejudice before

the court will overturn a conviction on the basis of
2

When the Court does not have findings of fact, "the record .
. . allows us to determine on appeal, as a matter of law, whether
defense counsel's performance constituted ineffective counsel."
State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v.
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)
3

Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims must
usually be addressed by collateral attack through habeas corpus
proceedings, in limited circumstances, the claim may raised on
direct appeal.
State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788 (Utah .App.
1992)(citations omitted). One of those circumstances is present in
the case at bar as there is new counsel on appeal.
State v.
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991). Therefore, this issue
is properly before the Court.
4

transcription errors.

State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Reps. 3

(Utah App. 1992).
Constitutional Issues Not Raised Below.

Constitutional

issues may not be asserted for the first time on appeal unless
the Defendant can demonstrate "plain error" cnr "exceptional
circumstances." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App.
1991).

Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional

and Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
unconstitutionality.

State v. Pharris, 204 Utah Adv. Rep 39

(Utah 1993); Greenwood v. North Salt Lake, 817 .2d 816 (Utah
1991).

Furthermore, a statute will be found void for vagueness

only if the statute fails to define the "offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited . Id.
Cumulative Error.

Cumulative error is to be reviewed under

a correction of error standard.

However, Defendant must show a

cumulative effect of individual errors which prejudiced his or
her right to a fair trial.

State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,

1146 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTE AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. VI
U.S. Const, amend. XIV
Utah Const, art. I, § 7
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301
Utah R. Evid. 403

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information and summons for
violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301, cruelty to animals, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-206, criminal trespass, and Utah Code Ann. § 766-106, criminal mischief, all class C misdemeanors.
mischief charge was dismissed prior to trial.
for jury trial January 28 and 29, 1992.

The criminal

The matter came on

The jury returned a

verdict of not guilty on the charge of criminal trespass.
Defendant was found guilty of cruelty to animals.
This appeal stems from the jury verdict and proceedings at
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the Summer of 1992, Tony and Amy Salazar acquired two
puppies—Blackjack, a black labrador, and Dottie Girl, a black
and gray husky-malamute mix. (Trial Transcript pages 2526)(hereinafter ("T.")).

Dottie Girl was described by Amy

Salazar and others as friendly, sweet-natured, outgoing and
playful.

(T. 28, 117)

Dottie Girl regularly played with the

Salazars' two year-old daughter as well as other children in the
neighborhood.

(T. 28-19)

Amy testified that, to her knowledge,

Dottie Girl had only been out of the fenced back yard twice when
the Salazars where not home. (T. 53)

After the first incident,

the Salazars took extra precautions to ensure that Dottie would
not get out. (T. 152) 4
4

Tony Salazar testified that he placed two garbage can lids
and then garbage cans up against the fence gate. He then put a
small swamp cooler in front of the garbage cans. The gate itself

6

On October 3, 1992, Tony and Amy left their home at 695
Cowley, in Layton to go to a family barbecue.
daughter, Sydney with a babysitter.

They left their

Before leaving, at

approximately 5:00 p.m., Tony checked the gate to make sure it
was secure. (T. 152)
about ten minutes.

Amy returned at 7:20 and was at home for

Amy left her home at about 7:30 p.m. to pick

up her husband in Kaysville and take the babysitter home. (T. 37,
41)

Before leaving the residence, Amy saw that her dogs,

Blackjack, then 4 months old, and Dottie Girl, then 6 months old,
were in the fenced backyard. (T. 40)
A neighbor, Cookie Perkins, testified that she walked around
the Salazarfs block from 7:30 to 8:00 p.m. the night of October
3.

Perkins observed the Salazar dogs on the Salazar's back steps

inside the fenced yard.

(T. 64-65)

At approximately 8:40 p.m., neighbor Richard Huff drove past
the Salazar residence.

As Huff drove past the house, he noticed

the Defendant, who lives just north of the Salazar residence,
standing inside the Salazars' front yard approximately eight
feet. (R. 85-87)

Defendant did not move or turn to make eye

contact as Huff drove past the home.

Defendant just stood,

facing east, staring straight ahead.

(T. 87)

Huff continued to

his own home three homes east of the Salazar residence.

Huff did

not see any dogs as he passed the Salazar residence. (T. 97)
Approximately fifteen (15) minutes after Huff arrived home,

was wrapped with a cable and clipped with a spring loaded clip so
the gate could not open accidently. (T.152)
7

Huff heard a "dog yelping in agony."
Huff heard the yelping again.

Three or four minutes later

Huff investigated and found the

Salazarsf puppy in a neighbors yard to the east.

He immediately

recognized the puppy as Dottie Girl, the Salazarsf Husky Malamute
puppy.

The dog was obviously injured and in a great deal of

pain. (T. 89)
was home.

Huff attempted to contact the Salazars' but no one

Huff called Davis County Animal Control to respond to

the scene. (T. 90)
The Salazars and Officer Brad Lee, Animal Control Officer
both came to the area at about 9:30 p.m.

After a cursory

examination of the puppy, Huff, the Salazars and Officer Lee all
concluded that the puppy had been hit by a car.

Huff and Tony

Salazar loaded the puppy into the back of Huff's pick-up and took
her to the veterinary hospital where Dr. Richard Winward had
agreed to meet them. (T. 92-93, 119)

Officer Lee remained behind

to question Amy Salazar.
Dr. Winward examined Dottie Girl (T. 106) and discovered
that the injuries were actually stab wounds.

Dr. Winward found

one severe puncture wound underneath the right eye and through
the eye socket, (T. 120), two stab wounds in the right shoulder,
one in the right forearm and two fatal wounds to the left side of
the abdomen totaling six stab wounds. (T. 121)

Dottie Girl was

taken off life support and she dies a short time later.

Dr.

Winward relayed information relating to the dog f s condition to
Officer Lee while Lee was at the Salazar home. (T. 105)

Officer

Lee responded to the animal hospital to verify Dr. Winward f s
8

telephoned information.

While at the animal hospital, Officer

Lee received another call from Davis County Dispatch indicating
there was a dog bite victim at Davis North Hospital Emergency
Room. Officer Lee responded to Davis North. (T.108)
Upon arrival at Davis North, Officer Lee made contact with
the Defendant.

Following Davis County Animal Control protocol,

Officer Lee asked the Defendant if he, Lee, could see Defendant's
wounds.

Defendant would not allow Officer Lee to examine the

wounds as they were bandaged and sterile.

Officer Lee then

inquired of the Defendant as to the facts leading to his
injuries.

Defendant would not respond to Lee's questions, but

simply sat silent.

(T. 109-110)

Realizing that there may be a connection between the two
incidents, and having information that a weapon was involved,
Officer Lee contacted Layton Police department and requested that
an officer respond to assist in the investigation. (T. 110-111)
Patrol Officer Stephen E. Hein, Layton Police Department
responded to Davis North Medical Center. (T. 128)

After advising

Defendant of his rights, per Miranda, Officer Hein spoke with the
Defendant about the incident. (T. 129)

Defendant told Officer

Hein that he was walking home about 8:30 p.m. when a small black
dog came up to him and was nipping at his heels.
kicked the small black dog.

He stated he

At that point, another dog, which he

described as a Husky-type dog ran up and started biting at his
legs and feet.

Defendant stated that he kicked at the dog and

then bent down to grab the dog at which point the dog bit him.

9

He threw the dog down, the dog left and he continued home where
he asked his wife to take him to the hospital. (R. 112, 129-130.)
During the interview with Defendant, Officer Hein noticed a
strong order of alcohol coming from Defendant's breath. (T. 130)
(Defendant later testified that he had consumed six to eight
beers in the two hour period, just prior to the incident.) (T.
225)

There were no scuff marks, or tears in Defendant's pant

legs. (T. 134). Defendant was wearing steel-toed boots. (T. 131)
Hein also noticed that the Defendant was wearing a folding
pocketknife with a four inch blade in a sheath on his belt. (T.
130)

Defendant allowed Officer Hein to examine the knife.
Officer Hein observed white or gray hairs in the hinge

mechanism of the blade.

Officer Hein also noticed there were

small specks of blood on the blade itself and inside the handle
into which the blade folded.

(T. 131)

Officer Hein asked the

Defendant if he had used the knife recently to cut any meat.

The

Defendant answered "no." (T. 132)
Officer Hein then told the Defendant that a witness had
observed the Defendant stab the dog.
the accusation.

(T. 132)

Defendant adamantly denied

Officer Hein relayed the condition of

Dottie Girl to the Defendant and again asked if the Defendant had
recently used the knife.

The Defendant then stated that he had

the knife out during the attack, but that he didn't believe he
had stabbed the dog. (T. 132)

Officer Hein took the knife as

evidence.
Officer Hein then proceeded to the Salazar residence.
10

Tony

Salazar reported to Officer Hein that when he and his wife had
returned to their home earlier in the evening they had found the
gate to their back yard open. (T. 136)

Tony stated that the gate

was strongly secured to keep the dogs in the back yard. (T. 136137)

Officer Hein examined the area for blood and did find blood

trails attributable to both Defendant and the puppy.

However, he

could not identify the exact location of the attack. (T. 137139.)
At trial Defendant told a different version of the events of
October 3.

Defendant testified that he was walking home on the

night of October 3, when he was attacked by the Salazarsf dogs.
He stated that the husky-malamute puppy was nipping at his heels
so he reached down to push it away.
then latched onto his arm.

He testified that the puppy

Defendant lifted his arm and the

puppy continued to hang from his arm.

Defendant testified that

the dog hung from his arm for twenty to thirty seconds before he
decided to use his knife. (T. 214)

He stated he pulled out his

knife and "stuck the dog . . . only two or three times." (T. 200)
The dog then let go of Defendant's arm, hit the ground and ran
towards the Salazars' house. (T. 199-200).

He then proceeded

home and had his wife drive him to the hospital for treatment of
his own injuries.5
5

Dr. Davenport, Davis North Hospital Emergency Room Doctor,
testified that he treated Defendant for one laceration and .four
puncture wounds on Defendant's hands and arm.
Dr. Davenport
testified that there were no injuries to Defendant's legs at the
time of the examination at the hospital at 9:10 p.m. October 3,
1992. (R. 83) (See Also Exhibit D-l) However, Defendant testified
to injuries on his leg and place photos into evidence showing a
11

Defendant further testified that Dottie Girl barked at him
when he would walk past the Salazar residence and that the
barking "annoyed" him (T. 221)
"daily,"

He said that Dottie Girl ran free

(T. 228) that the puppy had "come at" him a couple of

times,(T. 222-223) but that he was "not extensively" afraid of
the dog. (T. 223)

Cookie Perkins, on the other hand, testified

that she walked past the Salazar residence at least eight times a
day, five days a week, (T. 61-62) that Dottie Girl occasionally
barked at her, but that the puppy never jumped on the fence
towards Perkins. (T. 67)

Perkins further testified that she had

never seen Dottie Girl running loose in the neighborhood. (T.68)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The jury received instruction on two different legal
privileges.

The instructions did not conflict and, when read

together with the other instructions, adequately presented the
Defendant's theory of the case to the jury.
The facts set forth at trial were sufficient to support the
jury's guilty verdict.

Evidence was presented to allow the jury

to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the offense.
Photographs of a canine autopsy were properly admitted into
evidence.

Even if this court finds that the trial court erred in

admitting the photographs, the admission of the photographs was
harmless error.

puncture type wound to one of his legs.

12

Defendant received effective ^^istance

counsel.
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(1) A person commits cruelty to animals it ne
intentionally, knowingly or with criminal neglicrence:

i

ziv.
elements

* * *

(f) kills, injures, or administers poison to an
animal without legal privilege, . . .
Privilege is a right held by a person against or beyond the
course of the law.6

"Legal privilege" used in the context of

Section 76-9-301 could take many different forms.

For example,

an animal control officer may have a legal privilege to kill an
animal, without the consent of the owner, if the animal has been
determined to be a threat to public health or safety (e.g.
disease, rabies, etc.).

A veterinarian could have a legal

privilege to kill an injured, dying animal, without the consent
of the owner, as a humanitarian act.
The jurors were instructed on two of the possible privileges
available to Defendant.

The jurors were instructed that an

individual has a privilege to use force and violence in self
defense, where it appears to be reasonably necessary to protect
against a threatened injury.7

This was clearly a proper

instruction as Defendant claimed he acted in self defense when he
stabbed the puppy.

This instruction placed the Defendant's

theory of the case before the jury and adequately apprised the
6

Blackfs Law Dictionary 5th Ed.

7

That instruction reads as follows:

You are instructed that an individual may, in self
defense, use that amount of force which appears to be
reasonably necessary, under the circumstances, for
protection against a threatened injury. This privilege
to use force and violence in self defense ceases after
the assailant is helpless, or all danger is clearly past.
(See Jury Instruction No. 11 attached as Exhibit 1)
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The instruction reads as i
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i:

Legal privilege means freedom to do what the law entitles
you to do. For purposes of this case, it means one's
right to exercise control over or decide the use or
disposition of one's property.
(

ittached -' Exhibi
9

See Utah Code Ann
Tim"11 ff , Definitions:

. .. _

j

(1) "Property" means anything c f value , ii ic] udi i: lg . . .
domestic animals.

cause for shooting the dog, . . . However, the trial
court confused the jury when it rendered its
instructions concerning the defense of others, . . •
[Based on the instruction} it would be impossible for
the jury to determine whether the "aggressor" were to
be determined as between Grizzle, Jr. and Chronister or
as between the dog and Grizzle Jr.
Grizzle, 707 P.2d at 213.

The facts at trial showed that

Grizzle, Jr. was an aggressor against Chronister and that
Chronisterfs dog had come to the aid of his master.

In Grizzle,

the possibility for confusion was apparent and the matter was
properly remanded for a new trial.
In the case at bar, only one instruction on the privilege of
self-defense was given.

The jury was also instructed on the

privilege of property ownership.

There is clearly no conflict

between the two as the instructions address two separate
privileges recognized by the law.

There could be no confusion

arising from the two instructions as the facts showed that
Defendant did not have legal privilege to kill the puppy by
permission of the property owner. (T. 156-157)

Therefore, the

only privilege left to the Defendant was that of self-defense.
Defendant's theory of the case was fairly presented to the jury
in a clear and understandable way, Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238.
Even if the trial court erred in giving instructions on two
separate privileges, it was harmless error.

This Court will

affirm when the instructions taken as a whole, "fairly tender the
case to the jury" even where "one or more of the instructions,
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have
been." Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1203. (citations omitted).
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POINT II: THE FACTS SET FORTH AT TRIAL SUPPORT THE
JURY'S GUILTY VERDICT.
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These instructions, tnougn numbered separately, are to be
considered and construed as one connected whole. Each
instruction should be read and understood in reference to
and as a part of the entire group of instructions and not
as though any one sentence or instruction separately were
intended to state the whole law of the case upon any
particular point.
Moreover, the order in which the
instructions are given has no significance as their
relative importance.
(See Jury Instruction Nc. 21 attached as Exhibit * 7 .
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not so inconclusive or improbable as to raise reasonable doubt as
to Defendant's guilt.
Defendant was seen in the Salazars' yard only minutes before
Dottie Girl was stabbed.
deliberately opened.

The gate to the back yard had been

Defendant was evasive when questioned at

the hospital about the events leading to his injuries and
adamantly denied having stabbed the dog.

However, circumstantial

evidence was overwhelming that Dottie Girl was stabbed with the
knife found in possession of the Defendant and that she was the
same dog that caused Defendant's slight injuries.

Dottie Girl

had been stabbed six times and ultimately died from the stab
wounds.

The owner of the Dog had not given the Defendant

permission to kill the animal.

This evidence is clearly

sufficient to establish a prima facia case of cruelty to animals.
The City concedes that if Defendant was attacked by the dog,
he had a legal privilege, and therefore a valid defense, to use
reasonable force to ward of the attack.11

However, the evidence

11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401(1), Justification of Defense - When
allowed.
(1) "When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons o
property under the circumstances described in sections 76-2402 . . . of this part."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1), Force in defense of person Forcible Felony Defined.
(1) "A person is justified in threatening or using force
against another when and to the extent that he reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to defend himself or a
third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force; however, a person is justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury
only if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to
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^Detendant seems to overlook the possibility that the jury did
accept his version of the facts, but simply concluded that his
actions of self defense went beyond the limits of reasonability
when he stabbed the dog the second, thi r d, four th, fi f th and six th
H me -
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acts were committed with the requisite intent for the crime
charged."

James at 791.

Defendant stabbed the puppy six times.

It was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Defendant
intended to kill the animal.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

The

jury's verdict should stand.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING CANINE AUTOPSY PHOTOGRAPHS.
Trial Courts have broad discretion in admitting or excluding
evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

This

Court will reverse a court's decision to admit evidence only if
the court's findings was beyond the limits of reasonability,
Dunn, at 109 (citing Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232), and the defendant
was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence.
Utah R. Evid 403.

Dunn, at 109.

When determining whether evidence is

admissible, it is necessary to determine first whether the
proffered evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury.

(State v. Dibello, 780

P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989).
It is clear that gruesome photographs of homicide victims
could be unfairly prejudicial.

Photographs of open wounds,

excessive blood, mutilation and deformity can be extremely
gruesome.

State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992); Dunn,

208 Utah Adv. Rep. at 109.

However,

the "gruesomeness" of such

photographs stems primarily from the fact that they are
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Cobb, the Utah Supreme Court ruled t. nai a photograph
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f

the

thp

homicide victim's body which had been washed and sutured, was
"relatively clear of blood," and showing only the area where the
wounds were inflicted was not gruesome.

Cobb, 774 at 1125.

Similarly the photographs of the animal autopsy in this case are
not gruesome.
Even if these photographs are determined to be gruesome by
this Court, the error does not justify reversal.

Defendant bears

the burden of showing that there was a reasonable likelihood that
absent the error, the result would have been more favorable to
the defendant.

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989).

There is nothing in this case that suggests, absent the admission
of the photographs, the result would have been more favorable to
the Defendant.
The trial Court in this case did review the pictures and
properly admitted them.13
POINT IV:
COUNSEL

DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

Defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his trial counsel failed to adequately object to
the jury instruction on legal privilege of a property owner, and
to the admission of canine autopsy photographs.
13

In order to

Counsel for Plaintiff stated "I suppose the Court would like
to see [the pictures]." The Court state, "The Court hasn't looked
at those. But based on the testimony, the Court overrules the
objection to Exhibits P-l-A through—what, H? oh, K I guess, except
G. Dr. Winward's testimony was the G didn't impart any information.
It's a blur. The Court feels that the others are appropriate. . .
." The Court reviewed the pictures as it ruled. The comment
"It's a blur," indicates the Court was looking at the pictures at
time it was ruling.
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The fact that defendant's trial counsel did not argue that
the photos were presumptively prejudicial and therefore required a
showing by the City of unusual, probative value, is not reversible
error since that is not establish lav with regard to canine autopsy
nhotographs.
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substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant,
Failure to meet the plain error requirement of prejudice means
that defendant also fails to meet the required showing under the
ineffective assistance of counsel standard.
Defendant has failed to show plain error.
forth in POINT I and POINT II above.)

Ellifritz, Id.
(See arguments set

Therefore, Defendant's

arguments claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
POINT V: THE TRANSCRIPT ADEQUATELY SETS FORTH THE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
This Court has ruled that the "mere existence of
[transcription errors] does not mandate a new trial."

The

defendant must make a showing of prejudice before the court will
overturn a conviction on the basis of transcription errors. State
v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Reps. 3 (Utah App. 1992).

Defendant

has failed to show any prejudice arising from errors or omissions
in the court transcript.

The trial transcript is 272 pages long

and covers virtually every aspect of the trial.

The minor errors

and omission in no way affect this Court's ability to review the
proceedings below.

The errors and omissions are so negligible

that no prejudice arises.
POINT VI: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NOT RAISED BELOW SHOULD
NOT BE ADDRESSED,
Defendant claims the statute under which he was convicted is
constitutionally void for vagueness or overbreadth.

However,

these issues are presented for the first time on appeal.

This

Court has ruled that a defendant may not assert a constitutional
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Defendant's cumulative error argument fails.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant has failed to show any basis for reversal of
the jury's guilty verdict entered against him.

The City

respectfully requests the Court to affirm Defendant's conviction,
Dated this

^ ^ ' ^ d a y of June# 1993.

& .

NE H. ELLER
orney for Plaintiff-Appellee
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ADDENDUM
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VI
Rights of Accused, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV
(1) Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection. All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I
Section 7 Due Process of Law. No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

28

STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301 - Cruelty to Animals.
(1) A person commits cruelty to animals if he
intentionally, knowingly, or with criminal negligence:
* * *

(f) kills, injures, or administers poison to an
animal without legal privilege. . . .

29

RULE
UTAH R. EVID. 40 3
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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NO.

DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JURY

Members of the Jury:

It is the duty of the court to instruct you in the law that
applies to this case, and it your duty as jurors to follow the
law as the court state^L it to you, regardless of what you
personally believe the law is or ought to be.

On the other

hand, it is your exclusive province to determine the facts in
the case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for that
purpose.

The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary power,
but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion,
and in accordance with rules of law state to you.

NO.

2-

ONE DEFENDANT
The defendant,
tO-wit:

ROBERT

p. ALSTON

, is charged with two

(1)

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, a Class C Misdemeanor.

(2)

CRIMINAL TRESPASS, a Class C Misdemeanor.

offenses,

It is your duty to determine, as to each charge, whether the defendant is
guilty of the offenses charged. While the charges are being tried jointly, it
nevertheless becomes your solemn duty to judge the guilt or innocence on each
charge, and at the close of these instructions the court will submit to you
separate verdicts regarding the guilt or innocence on each charge.

if/

NO.

3

STATEMENT OF CHARGE NOT STATEMENT OF FACT
The foreqoing instructions are not to be regarded as statements
of facts proved in this case, but are to be considered merely as summarized statements of the accusations aaainst the defendant.

NO.

f

DEFENDANT BEING CHARGED AMD HELD TO ANSWER
NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT
The fact that the defendant has been charged with offenses and
has been held to answer thereto is not to be reaarded as any evidence
of his auilt and no inference or oresumption adverse to him should be
drawn because of these facts.

NO.

DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF NOT GUILTY PUTS BURDEN ON STATE
The defendant has entered pleas of not guilty to the charqes of:
(1)

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

(2)

CRIMINAL TRESPASS

This casts upon the !S8te (or City) the burden of provina beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the elements of each offense charged which
elements are set forth in Instruction No.

G .

.

NO.

L

DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE
Before you can convict the defendant of the offense of
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that offense.
1. That the defendant injured or caused the death of a dog,
2.

That he did so intentionally or knowingly,

3.

That he did so without legal privilege* and

4.

That such acts occurred in Lay ton City on October 3, 1992.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your
duty to convict the defendant.

On the other hand, if the evidence has failed

to so establish one or more of said elements then you should find the
defendant not guilty.

NO.

X
INTENT

A person engages in conduct:
(1)

Intentionally, or with intent with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct,
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the resuult.

(2)

Knowingly, or with knowledge with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the
existing circumstances.

Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of
proof by direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be
inferred fromacts, conduct, statements and circumstances.

No.

(

DEFINITION OF LEGAL PRIVILEGE
Legal privilege means freedom to do what the law
entitles you to do.

For purposes of this case, it means

one's right to exercise control over or decide the use
or disposition of one's property.

HO.

10

DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE
Before you can convict the defendant of the offense of
CRIMINAL TRESPASS

you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that offense.
1. That defendant entered unlawfully on property,
2.

3.

That at the time, he intended to cause damage to
property or intended to commit a crime, and
That such occurred in Layton City on October 3, 1992•

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your
duty to convict the defendant.

On the other hand, if the evidence has failed

to so establish one or more of said elements then you should find the
defendant not guilty.

No.

f1

SELF DEFENSE
You are instructed that an individual may, in self
defense, use that amount of force which appears to be
reasonably necessary, under the circumstances, for
protection against a threatened injury.

This privilege to

use force and violence in self defense ceases after the
assailanat is helpless, or all danger is clearly past.

NO.

i^

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
A person charged with an offense is presumed to be innocent
until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded
by the jury at pleasure, but is a substantial, essential part
of the law and is binding upon the jury. This presumption is a
humane provision of the law, intended, so far as human agency
is capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person
being unjustly punished.
The presumption of innocence must continue^ to prevail in
the minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.

NO.

B.

PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

You have been instructed that the burden is upon
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty. A reasonable doubt is one based on reason, one
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. It is not a
doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt, A reasonable doubt
is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and
it must arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence in this
case.

NO.
JURY TO DETERMINE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE,
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES AND FACTS
You are the sole judges of the weight of the evidence, the
credibility of the witnesses and the facts. In considering the
testimony of a witness you may consider his appearance and
demeanor, his apparent frankness and candor, or the want of it;
his opportunity to observe, his ability to understand and his
capacity to remember. You may consider the interest, if any is
shown, which any witness may have in the result of the trial;
and also any bias he may have, or any motive or probable motive
which any witness may have to testify for or against either
party.
If you believe any witness has wilfully testified falsely,
as to any material fact in the case, you are at liberty to
disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness, except as
he may have been corroborated by other credible witnesses or
credible evidence. You are not bound to believe all that the
witnesses may have testified to nor are you bound to believe
any witness; you may believe one witness as against many, or
many as against one. In the light of the above observation it
is your privilege to judge the weight to be given to the
testimony of the witnesses and to determine what the facts are.

INSTRUCTION NO.

DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Evidence admitted in court can be either of two kinds or
classifications:

direct evidence or circumstantial

evidence.
If a person were to- smell, taste, feel, hear or see an act,
incident, event or condition with one or more of his or her
physical senses and later describe it as a witness in court,
that would be direct evidence.

All other evidence is

circumstantial evidence.
The law makes no distinction between these two kinds of
evidence as to their usefulness or value in court
proceedings, but respects each for such convincing force as
it may carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of
proof.
verdict.

Both may be considered by you in arriving at a

NO.

lb

POSSIBLE SENTENCE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED

In arriving at a verdict in this case you should not
consider or discuss what sentence or punishment defendant would
receive if convicted. Deciding what sentence is appropriate is
a function of the court, and it generally makes that
determination with the help of other agencies. Many factors
bear on the sentence to be imposed in the event of a
conviction, and you should not concern yourselves with that
aspect of the case.

NO.

II

DEFENDANT IS COMPETENT WITNESS
The defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf, and
the fact that he is charged with the commission of an offense
should not be regarded by you as tending to impeach or
discredit his testimony. However, in weighing his testimony
you make take into consideration his interest in the matter and
give his testimony the same fair and impartial consideration
you are obliged to give to all of the evidence in the case.

NO.
ATTITUDE OF JUDGE NOT TO INFLUENCE JURY
If the court has said or done anything during this trial
which has suggested to you that it is inclined to favor the
claims or position of either party, you should not permit
yourselves to be influenced by it.
The court has not intended to indicate any opinion as to
which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, or as to which
party should prevail. If any expression has seemed to
indicated any opinion relating to any of these matters, you
should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges of
the facts.

NO.
ADMITTED EVIDENCE, STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL OR A PARTY
In arriving at a verdict, you should consider only evidence
admitted during the trial, and should weigh the evidence
fairly, impartially and conscientiously. You should not
consider or be influenced by evidence offered but not admitted,
or by evidence stricken out by the court. You should not
consider or be influenced by statements of counsel or a party
as to what the evidence is unless it is stated correctly, or by
any statement of facts not shown in evidence if any such has
been or should hereafter be made.
At times throughout the trial the court has been called
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence should be
admitted. You should not be concerned with the reasons for
such rulings and should not draw any inferences from them.
Whether offered evidence is admissible is a question of law.
In admitting evidence to which an objection has been made, the
court does not determine what weight should be given to such
evidence, nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness.

ZLO
JURORS TO DELIBERATE AND AGREE IF POSSIBLE
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and
to deliberate, with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can
do so without violence to your individual judgment. You each
must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after
a consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You
should not hesitate to change an opinion j&f convinced that it
is erroneous. However, you should not surrender your honest
convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the
mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the
opinion of the other jurors.

NO.__J2L/__
CONSIDER ALL TOGETHER
These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be
considered and construed as one connected whole. Each
instruction should be read and understood in reference to and
as a part of the entire group of instructions and not as though
any one sentence or instruction separately were intended to
state the whole law of the case upon any particular point.
Moreover, the order in which the instructions are given has no
significance as their relative importance.

No.

^ - ^

JURY TO APPOINT FOREPERSON
CONCURRENCE OF ALL JURORS
FOREPERSON SIGNS VERDICT

When you retire to deliberate you should appoint one of
your number as foreperson. Your verdict must be in writing, signed
by your foreperson and when found must be returned by you into
court.
Your verdict in this case must be:
Guilty Of

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

as charged in the Information, or not quilty; as your deliberations
may result.
Guilty Of

CRIMINAL TRESPASS

as charged in the information, or not guilty; as your deliberations
may result.
This being a criminal case i t requires a unanimous concurrence
of all the jurors to find a verdict.
Dated this

^-*?

day of

N

"A^ -

19^.

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
County of Davis, Layton Department

STATE OF UTAH, by and through,
LAYTON CITY

plaintiff,

VERDICT

vs.

921001243

ROBERT D. ALSTON

Defendant-

We the jurors in the above case, find the defendant,
(1) Guilty as charged, or

)

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

&)—Nut-SirrHy--

4+)—Guilty as charged, or )
CRIMINAL TRESPASS

(2) Not Guilty

Dated

/-Z9-Z-3

